Gibbon advirtió que es raro que el anticuario y el filósofo se fundan felizmente, pero Jacob Bernays (1824-1881) encarnó ejemplarmente esa figura, a la que añadió la fidelidad al judaísmo. Discípulo de F. Ritschl —el maestro de Nietzsche y Rohde— y amigo de T. Mommsen, llegó a tener un dominio completo de la filología y sus repercusiones en la actualidad. Su interés por Gibbon se manifestó en numerosas conferencias y en las notas de trabajo que traducimos a continuación, de (...) las que Arnaldo Momigliano escribió que no habían perdido su valor cien años después; más de medio siglo ha pasado desde esa apreciación inalterable. El texto, que reproducimos literalmente sin intervención editorial, se encuentra en _Gesammelte Abhandlungen von Jacob Bernays_, ed. de H. Usener, Verlag von Wilhelm Hertz, Berlín, 1885, vol. 2, pp. 206-254. Entre corchetes figuran las aclaraciones del editor alemán (su gran discípulo Usener). Agradecemos al profesor Venancio Andreu Baldó la revisión de la traducción. (shrink)

This paper takes its point of departure in an article by Stevens [Stevens, B.: 1994, Journal of Business Ethics 54, 163–171], in which she identified a lack of knowledge regarding how corporate codes of ethics are communicated and affect behavior in organizations. Taking heed of this suggested gap, we review studies on corporate codes of ethics with an empirical content, published since 1994. The conclusion of the review is that we still lack knowledge on how codes work, how they are (...) communicated and how they are transformed inside organizations. Stevens’ plea could even be extended, arguing that the knowledge gap might be of even more significance than in the mid-1990s. Some directions for how this situation can be approached in future studies are outlined in the paper. (shrink)

In this article, we focus on the cross-cultural aspects of the implementation of an American company's code of ethics into its Swedish subsidiary. We identify the cross-cultural stories that the receivers in the subsidiary use when trying to explain the parent's code and conceptualize these stories as part of an emerging narrative of national belonging and differences. The receivers resisted the code by amplifying the importance of national identity. Rather than stimulating a discussion on ethics that might have strengthened the (...) ties between the parent and the subsidiary, the outcome of the code implementation had the opposite effect. The article concludes by stressing the process of implementing codes across cultures rather than code content. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the current debate about radical scepticism and the structure of warrant. After a presentation of the standard version of the radical sceptic’s challenge, both in its barest and its more refined form, three anti-sceptical responses, and their respective commitments, are being identified: the Dogmatist response, the Conservativist response and the Dretskean response. It is then argued that both the Dretskean and the Conservativist are right that the anti-sceptical hypothesis cannot inherit any perceptual warrants from ordinary propositions (...) about the environment—and so the Dogmatist response founders. However, if this is so Epistemic Closure lacks any clear rationale. There is therefore good reason to agree with both the Dretskean and the Dogmatist that perceptual warrants for ordinary propositions about the environment are enough in order for those propositions to enjoy a positive epistemic status—and so the Conservativist response founders. However, the Conservativist is nonetheless right that a warrant for the anti-sceptical hypothesis is needed. For contrary to what much of the recent literature suggests, the radical sceptic need not appeal to Epistemic Closure in order to cast doubt on the legitimacy of our beliefs in ordinary propositions about the environment: there is a Pyrrhonian version of scepticism that, though equally radical, is consistent with failure of Epistemic Closure. For this reason, the Dretskean response is insufficient to answer scepticism. (shrink)

The paper introduces ten open problems in belief revision theory, related to the representation of the belief state, to different notions of degrees of belief, and to the nature of change operations. It is argued that these problems are all issues in philosopical logic, in the strong sense of requiring inputs from both logic and philosophy for their solution.

Discusses Indian Buddhist philosophy in three phases of its development.

The purpose of this presentation is to introduce both the concept of risk and the precautionary principle, that is a major policy principle in present-day risk management. Since risk has been the subject of many misconceptions I will do this in large part by criticizing seven views on risk that I believe to have caused considerable confusion both among scientists and policy-makers. But before looking at the seven myths of risk, let us begin with the basic issue of defining “risk”. (...) The word “risk” often refers, rather vaguely, to situations in which it is possible but not certain that some undesirable event will occur. In addition, the word has several more specialized meanings. Let me illustrate this by making a few statements about the single most important preventable health hazard in non-starving countries. First: “Lung cancer is one of the major risks that affect smokers.” Here, we use “risk” in the following sense: (1) risk = an unwanted event which may or may not occur. 1 (15). (shrink)

This book provides students with a toolbox for the study of the ethics of technology, exploring the methods available for ethical assessments of technologies and their social introduction. An international team of leading experts in the field provides the first comprehensive treatment of the topic, including case studies and annotated further reading.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

THAT a human action is in some sense identical with its physiological basis is true. The sense in which that identity is properly to be understood is a very subtle one, and although I shall make some suggestions about it here, this paper is designed chiefly to make the negative point that the identity is, at any rate, not properly to be understood in the sense that a physicalist would maintain. The physicalist theory of the identity of A and PB (...) is analogous to the theory of mind-body identity maintained by central state materialists, but I shall not deal directly with the latter theory, for reasons that will soon become clear. All the same, if the present refutation of a physicalist identity of A and PB is successful, it will be seen to be a fortiori effective against the analogous mind-body identity. (shrink)

The arguments of the dialetheists for the rejection of the traditional law of noncontradiction are not yet conclusive. The reason is that the arguments that they have developed against this law uniformly fail to consider the logic of encoding as an analytic method that can resolve apparent contradictions. In this paper, we use Priest [1995] and [1987] as sample texts to illustrate this claim. In [1995], Priest examines certain crucial problems in the history of philosophy from the point of view (...) of someone without a prejudice in favor of classical logic. For each of these problems, the logic of encoding offers an alternative explanation of the phenomena---this alternative is not considered when Priest describes what options there are in classical logic for analyzing the problem at hand. -/- The argument at heart of the case that Priest develops against the law of noncontradiction (i.e., the argument based on the paradoxes of self-reference) is then reanalyzed in light of encoding logic. After showing why the argument is inconclusive, the paper concludes both with a more general discussion of logic and predication and with the suggestion that there is no need to tamper with the logic of the traditional mode of predication if there is alternative mode of predication which is well-suited to the analysis of cases involving contradictory objects. (shrink)

Objectivism and projectivism are standardly taken to be incompatible theories of color. Here we argue that this incompatibility is only apparent: objectivism and projectivism, properly articulated so as to deal with basic objections, are in fundamental agreement about the ontology of color and the phenomenology of color perception.

The public defence of science has never been more important than now. However, it is a difficult task with many pitfalls, and there are mechanisms that can make it counterproductive. This article offers advice for science defenders, summarized in ten commandments that warn against potentially ineffective or even backfiring practices in the defence of science: Do not portray science as a unique type of knowledge. Do not underestimate scientific uncertainty. Do not describe science as infallible. Do not deny the value-ladenness (...) of science. Do not associate with power. Do not blame the victims of disinformation. Do not aim at convincing the anti-scientific propagandists. Do not contribute to the legitimization of pseudoscience. Do not attack religion when it does not conflict with science. Do not call yourself a “sceptic”. (shrink)

Christine M. Korsgaard ist eine der einflussreichsten Stimmen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. In ihren Arbeiten zur Moralphilosophie Kants verteidigt sie diese gegen zwei Einwände: erstens, dass der kategorische Imperativ auf externe Werte angewiesen ist, mithin als formales Testverfahren scheitere, und, zweitens, dass Kant empfindungsfähige Wesen, die kein Vernunftvermögen besitzen, aus seiner Ethik ausgeschlossen habe und ausschließen musste. Den ersten Einwand glaubt Korsgaard durch eine spezifische Interpretation des kantischen Widerspruchsverständnisses zumindest partiell zurückweisen zu können. Wie ich zeigen werde, unterschätzt Korsgaard allerdings die Probleme, (...) die die Allgemeine Formel des kategorischen Imperativs mit sich bringt. Den zweiten Einwand wiederum glaubt Korsgaard in Form einer immanenten Kritik entkräften zu können: Kant selbst hätte auf Grundlage seines transzendentalen Arguments für die Selbstzweckformel zu dem Schluss kommen können, dass Tiere Zwecke an sich sind. Meine Thesen lauten, (a) dass Korsgaards Kant-Auslegung nicht vom Text gedeckt ist, (b) ihr Regress-upon-the-conditions-Argument nicht zur Begründung einer interpersonellen Moral taugt und es (c) auch tierethisch nicht zum gewünschten Ziel führt. (shrink)

Black and Gilson have argued that “venture capital can flourish especially – and perhaps only – if the venture capitalist can exit from a successful portfolio company through an initial public offering, which requires an active stock market.” But nothing in the Black and Gilson analysis requires that the exit option be a domestic capital market. In this article, I use the phenomenon of Israeli hi-tech companies going public on the Nasdaq as a case study to explore the connection between (...) a venture capital industry and domestic capital markets in a world of global capital and product markets. (shrink)

Se resumen las ventajas y desventajas de la formalización en filosofía. Se concluye que la filosofía formalizada es una especialidad en peligro que necesita ser revitalizada, y que debe incrementar sus interacciones con la filosofía no formalizada. El estilo enigmático, que es común en la lógica filosófica, debe llevar a discusiones explícitas sobre la relación problemática entre modelos formales, conceptos filosóficos y temas que motiven su desarrollo.